The Court of Protection considered issues of borderline capacity within the context of Forced Marriage Protection Orders.
The court considered Art. 8 and applied a purposive construction to statute in an application for a parental order pursuant to s.54 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 in a situation where a surrogacy arrangement had been entered into by a husband and wife and the husband has died after the application for a s.54 order but before the hearing. The child had been joined as a party and parental orders were made.
This case is interesting for its use of the dicta in Miller in an Inheritance Act context. The CA upheld a first instance judgment conferring on a widow the right to occupy the home for life and half the proceeds of sale (the other half being held by her step son), the whole of the residuary estate and the agreement of the step son to pay half the insurance and the structural repairs of the property in substitution for the sum of £8,000 and the right to occupy the former matrimonial home left to her by her husband.
The CA dismissed a mother’s appeal against the refusal of a residential assessment under s.38(6). The CA considered recent case law in respect of the fairness of proceedings and the Public Law Outline in coming to the decision that the Judge’s decision had been well within her discretion.
The CA struck out a paragraph within a preamble providing that no fact finding hearing in relation to the maternity of a 15 year old child subject to care proceedings as she refused a DNA test. The CA struck out the paragraph as the issue needed to be addressed but made it clear that it would not require a fact finding hearing for a clear inference to be drawn. The CA further noted that the county court would not be bound by the findings of the Immigration Tribunal in respect of maternity.
The CA allowed a father’s appeal against an order allowing a mother to relocate to Canada with the couple’s two children. Although all three judges allowed the appeal two of the three judges considered that Payne should not be applied to cases involving shared residence orders while Black LJ took the view that all the facts of each individual case needed to be considered.